Introduction
Semiconductor devices have long been seen as a trusted component at the foundation of the cybersecurity stack. However, as AI becomes more effective at identifying and exploiting vulnerabilities [learn more], this foundational layer is put at even more risk of exploitation. Attacks no longer look for just software weaknesses, but will target firmware, HW/SW interfaces, and the underlying hardware itself, exposing gaps that were historically overlooked or assumed to be secure.
In response, we see rising awareness for security assurance at the hardware-level. Numerous security standards and regulatory frameworks have begun to incorporate requirements for electronic hardware. Governments and industry bodies alike are also placing greater emphasis on security-by-design principles for hardware development, requiring organizations to not only address risk early, but to continuously document decisions and produce verifiable compliance evidence.
The following sections highlight some of the key standards shaping this new era of hardware security, including the:
- European Union Cyber Resilience Act
- ISO/SAE 21434
- IEEE SA-EDI
- DO-254
- Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) for Hardware
European Union (EU) Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)
The EU CRA is a regulation introduced by the European Commission in 2022 as part of the EU’s broader cybersecurity strategy, with enforcement phases beginning later this decade. It was created in response to the rise in cyber incidents linked to insecure connected products and the lack of consistent security requirements across manufacturers. The CRA applies to any “product with digital elements” sold in the EU, including both software and hardware systems—covering firmware, connectivity, and device interfaces. Its goal is to establish a common baseline for security, improve accountability, and reduce risk across the entire product ecosystem.
Responsibility under the CRA is placed primarily on device manufacturers. They are accountable for ensuring that products meet security requirements before entering the market and throughout their lifecycle. This has direct implications for semiconductor and microelectronics companies, even if they are not always the final product manufacturer. Their components are embedded in end devices, which means their design decisions, security features, and documentation all feed into the manufacturer’s ability to meet CRA requirements. As a result, these suppliers will face increasing pressure to provide transparency, security features, and supporting artifacts as part of the overall compliance chain.
A core part of the CRA is the expectation of security-by-design elements. Security needs to be considered early and carried through development, rather than addressed after the fact. Teams are required to document risk decisions throughout development, creating a clear record of identified risks, mitigation steps, and any accepted trade-offs. This level of traceability is important for both internal processes and regulatory review.
The CRA also requires organizations to maintain clear compliance evidence. This includes artifacts like threat models, BOMs, vulnerability management processes, and update mechanisms. For hardware products, this applies directly to how firmware is secured, how interfaces are protected, and how connectivity is managed over time. These practices also make it easier to support 3PIP (third-party intellectual property), which will be required in many cases. Overall, the CRA pushes companies toward a more structured and consistent approach, including hardware security.
ISO/SAE 21434 – Road vehicles – Cybersecurity engineering
As road vehicles become more network connected, their cybersecurity standards have increased. ISO/SAE 21434:2021 has laid out requirements on cybersecurity hardening and introduced dedicated terminology for hardware-based assurance. This has begun to shift hardware security as part of vehicle type approval. Devices are expected to support secure boot, hardware-based cryptography, and isolation mechanisms that hold up across the full vehicle lifecycle, from production through end-of-life.
As software-defined vehicles expand the attack surface, hardware plays a larger role in meeting these requirements. ISO 21434 drives the use of structured processes like Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment, which help teams track risks and decisions over time and support regulations like UN R155. In practice, this means hardware needs to support secure over-the-air updates, resist physical tampering, and provide the level of traceability expected for compliance.
IEEE SA-EDI
The Security Annotation for Electronic Design Integration (SA-EDI) standard, initially created by Accellera but now moved to IEEE, is revolutionizing how the semiconductor industry handles security in third-party IP. Traditionally, integrating external IP meant manually reviewing documentation to find potential weaknesses, a process that is both time-consuming and error-prone. In many cases, teams also rely on vendor-provided verification artifacts, which still require interpretation and validation on the user’s side. SA-EDI replaces this bottleneck with a standardized, machine-readable format that explicitly defines security assets, boundaries, and potential Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) within a design. This structured approach allows SoC integrators to automate security verification, ensuring that the “black box” components they rely on meet the rigorous integrity requirements of modern silicon.
The standard provides a common language for IP providers to disclose security objectives, such as confidentiality and integrity, without exposing sensitive RTL or proprietary secrets. This transparency is critical for scaling complex chip designs where hundreds of subsystems must interact securely.
DO-254
DO-254, formally known as Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware, is a standard used in aviation to check that electronic hardware in aircraft is safe and reliable. Developed by RTCA and widely accepted by certification authorities like the FAA and EASA, it provides a framework for designing, verifying, and validating hardware such as circuit boards, FPGAs, and custom chips used in avionics systems. Rather than instructing specific design techniques, DO-254 focuses on the development process, requiring clear requirements, traceability, and documented evidence that the hardware performs correctly under all expected conditions. This approach helps engineers show that highly complex hardware behaves predictably and meets strict safety expectations.
DO-254’s role in managing risk in increasingly complex airborne systems marks its importance in the sector. As aircraft electronics have evolved, the potential for hidden design errors has grown, making systematic verification and validation necessary. The standard introduces design assurance levels, ranging from minor impact to catastrophic failure, which determines how rigorous the development and testing processes must be. By enforcing meticulous planning, verification, and comprehensive documentation, DO-254 makes sure that safety is built into hardware from the beginning of development.
Read more about Caspia’s application towards DO-254 with the following white paper: CODAx and SVx for Aerospace and Defense – Caspia Technologies™
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) for Hardware
CWE Most Important Hardware Weaknesses
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is a structured, community-developed catalog of known security weaknesses in both hardware and software systems. Instead of describing specific attacks, CWE focuses on the underlying design or implementation flaws that make those attacks possible, giving each weakness a unique identifier so engineers and tools can reference them consistently. In hardware, CWE entries describe recurring issues in chip design such as improper access control, insecure debug interfaces, or weak isolation between components. These weaknesses are important because hardware flaws are often difficult or impossible to patch after deployment, making early identification necessary. CWE also serves as a shared language across design, verification, and security teams, allowing for clearer communication when documenting vulnerabilities or defining security requirements.
CWEs started with a focus on software-only weaknesses. Starting in 2020, they have begun including hardware-focused CWEs. To help users focus on what matters most, MITRE publishes curated lists like the “Most Important Hardware Weaknesses,” which highlight common root causes behind real-world vulnerabilities. Examples include failures to isolate shared resources on a system-on-chip, exposing sensitive data through side channels, or allowing debug features to bypass security controls. Engineers also use CWEs to guide secure design practices, from threat modeling to verification planning. It is often linked with real-world vulnerability databases, helping teams understand how a design weakness can evolve into an exploitable flaw. By integrating CWEs into design reviews, automated checks, and validation workflows, teams can address systemic risks early in the hardware lifecycle.
Conclusion
The increased focus on hardware security is not temporary. It reflects a long-term shift in how systems are designed, evaluated, and brought to market. As threats continue to evolve and regulatory expectations expand, organizations will need to adopt more scalable and automated approaches to security analysis, traceability, and compliance. Those that fail to adapt risk not only security vulnerabilities, but also delays in certification, market access, and customer trust.
At Caspia, we are proud to support semiconductor teams navigating towards evidence-based security assurance. Our solutions are built to integrate security directly into the development process, enabling teams to identify vulnerabilities early, maintain continuous traceability, and generate the compliance evidence required by today’s standards. If you’re looking to simplify hardware security and stay ahead of evolving requirements, we’d be happy to connect.
